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American trade policy m thrs century has been characterrzed by a struggle between interests seekmg protectron from Imports agamst free trade advocates In 1935, politrcal scientrst E E Schattschnader concluded that effective special interest pressure convinced
Congress to ignore warmngs and dramatrcally rarse tar&l% m the 1930 Smoot-Hawley bill '
Schaitschneider was the first of many pohtrcal screntists to analyze why opponents of trade hberahzatron exert pohtrcal influence drsproportronate to then numbers He concluded that consumers exert less pohtical influence over trade pohcy than busmess because they tend to be less well orgamzed
Wrthm the busmess commumty itself, opponents of hberal trade tend to expend greater efforts to influence trade pohcy-makmg I M Destler outlmes three reasons why a rnmorrty of producers threatened by imports can wreld drsproportronate influence on the policy process 2
Frrst, there is a chrome imbalance m zntenszty of Interest and hence m polmcal orgamzatron and mfluence between those who benefit from trade protectron and those who pay the costs Consumer interests tend to be weak and inchoate compared wrth orgamzed mdustry lobbymg Destler also points out that special interests hrstoncally focus attention on the Congress because rt IS less cohesive than the executrve branch and more subJect to pohtrcal pressure Congress is a decentrahzed, undrsaphned mstrtutron, partrcularly susceptible to pressure from orgamzed mterests So if rt 'does what comes naturally,' if the pohtrcs of benefit seekmg and log-rolhng goes ummpeded, the result will be a high level of trade bar-r-rem, to the benefit of certam groups and the detnment of the nation as a whole 3 John Tremey agreed wrth Destler when he wrote "Orgamzed interests have found in the contemporary Congress a highly permeable and open mstrtutronal setting that IS generally hosprtable to then efforts to influence policy decrsions"4
Grven the pohtrcal mfluence of trade hberahzatron opponents, many pundits doubted the executive branch could negotrate a "pohtrcally acceptable" multrlateral trade hberaliiatron package in the comprehensrve General Agreement on TarrEs and Trade (GATT) negotratrons known as the Uruguay Round Although the executive branch represented the Umted States at these multrlateral negotiations, by law rt had to subnnt rmplementmg legrslatron to the "'We should grve hrgh pnonty to hberahzmg professronal servrces, because many mfluentral professronals wrll be affected by any hberahzatron we a&eve m thrs area These are highly educated people They're vocal, they vote, and they can become strong advocates for what we're doing "lo
The second reason the services mdustry found a receptrve executive branch audience was because USTR officrals believed that trade hberahzatlon was good public pohcy The services mdustry was not demandmg a dramatic departure from U S trade pohcy, rather rt sought an expansion of government efforts consrstent with that pohcy When the servrces mdustry convmcmgly demonstrated that servrce exports were rmportant to U S economrc The servrces industry succeeded because rt skrllfblly framed a message to define its goals m congruence wrth those of the executive branch The Reagan, Bush and Chnton admmistratrons all supported global trade hberahzatron Servrces mdustry mfluence, however, was enhanced by executive-legrslatrve branch tension mherent m the constrtutronal "checks and balances" system To Implement the Uruguay Round agreement, USTR needed pohtlcal I6 These are nattonal treatment (core obhgauon that each nattonal government would grant equal trea ent to servxes products of all others adhenng to GATS), transparency (government rule-malung cond cted openly), market access, the free flos+ of payments and transfers, and "most favored natron" (any 3 bene t extended to a forergn servxe must be extended to servrces unparted from any other GATS srgnatory) I7 Spero, 6 
